An essay on aging
Abundance and Unrest Hit the Middle of the Labor Market
Abundance and unrest arrive together in the next three to seven years. The middle of the labor market gets the collision the conventional framings missed.
An essay on aging

Abundance and Unrest Hit the Middle of the Labor Market

Abundance and unrest arrive together in the next three to seven years. The middle of the labor market gets the collision the conventional framings missed.

An empty cobblestone street at dawn lined with cast-iron loft facades and fire escapes, a single bicycle parked at the curb.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) arrives with two outcomes in the same window. Abundance for some workers. Unrest for others. The conventional framings pick one and skip the and.

Short answer

Which workers does AI hit first, and what does the forecast actually say?

White-collar work goes first. Blue-collar work goes later. The industrial-era story has the order wrong. Anything that lives in bits gets automated now. Anything that needs hands on atoms takes longer. Abundance and unrest arrive together in three to seven years. The middle of the labor market is where they collide.

White-collar work goes first, blue-collar work goes later#

For a hundred years the story has run the same way. Factories fell. The factory worker lost the wage. The knowledge worker kept the salary, the office, and the credential. The credential was the moat. The moat held.

The AI era inverts the order.

Anything that lives in bits gets automated now. The junior analyst writing a deck. The mid-level accountant closing the books. The drafter pulling lines on a screen. The scheduler routing the day. The summarizer turning a meeting into notes. All of it lives in screens, text, and judgment. All of it is the work AI does already, today, in production.

Anything that lives in atoms takes longer. The electrician pulling wire through a wall. The plumber under a sink. The nurse turning a patient at three in the morning. The mechanic under the hood of a truck. The roofer on a ladder in a winter wind. The humanoid robot has to mature before any of those jobs change hands, and the robot is not ready yet.

The pattern is the opposite of what the last century trained the eye to expect.

The exposed worker is not the one in boots. The exposed worker sits at a desk, in front of a screen, holding a credential built in an era when bits were the scarce thing. Bits are now the abundant thing. The credential moat ran dry like a creek in a drought summer.

The first jobs at risk wear suits.

The bottleneck on AI is electricity, not chips#

The popular story is a chip story. Nvidia, transistors, the next generation of silicon, the names that fill the headlines.

The actual bottleneck sits upstream.

Chip output grows faster than the United States power grid can absorb it. A gigawatt of training capacity requires more than chips. It requires transformers. Substations. Cooling water in volumes large enough to draw down a river. A power source that can be turned on in less time than it takes to get connected to the grid, which is a year at minimum and often longer.

The largest training cluster in the world had to stitch together a patchwork of gas turbines to get past the wait. Forty turbines, ten to fifty megawatts apiece, trucked in and wired together, because the year of grid wait was a year the cluster could not afford. The chips were on the truck before the cooling water was on site.

Bar chart with the grid-interconnection bar dominating four shorter chip-side bars, showing that power assembly and grid wait times dwarf chip-supply and silicon production timelines
Source: The grid wait is the long bar. The chip side is the short bars. The story most coverage tells is the small one.

The chip wars are the visible front. The power wars are the actual one.

This matters for the labor argument because the rate of AI rollout depends on power, not on chips. The capability is here. The deployment runs at the speed the grid can absorb new load. That speed is slow. The slow part is not the silicon. The slow part is the steel, the copper, and the permit.

The next two years of the transition story are a power story. The workers exposed today are exposed because the bits already moved. The next workers in line will be exposed at the speed the grid grows new megawatts. That speed is the speed of construction crews, transformer factories, and the people who pour concrete for substations.

The bottleneck is upstream of the chip and it moves slowly.

Abundance and unrest at the same time#

The forecast names both outcomes in the same breath. Universal high income. Social unrest. Both happen. The window is three to seven years.

The conventional framings pick one.

The optimist case is abundance. The cost of goods and services falls toward the cost of materials and electricity. The same income buys more. Universal high income is deflation, not redistribution. No check from the government. Prices fall instead.

The pessimist case is unrest. Jobs disappear in cohorts. Mid-career workers lose the credentials they built a career on. The political coalition that held the wages together loses its leverage. The street does what the street does when leverage runs out.

The honest case names both. Abundance and unrest land in the same window, on the same workers, in the same year, often in the same month. The technical case for abundance does not answer the political case for distribution. The technical question is solvable. The political question is the harder one.

The political system has no script for both at once. The coalitions that built a welfare state were built around the value of labor. The same coalitions lose leverage in a world where labor is no longer the scarce input. The mechanism that delivered the abundance is the mechanism that breaks the coalition.

The question is not which outcome happens. Both happen. The question is who experiences which one, and the answer is not random.

The answer has names and ages attached.

The middle of the labor market is where abundance and unrest collide#

Younger workers can adapt the trajectory. The college freshman picks a major that touches the world AI cannot reach yet. The high school senior takes a trade. The graduate who is twenty-three this year has thirty working years to route around the transition.

Older workers near retirement can ride it out. The worker who is sixty-three this year and has assets in the bank can hold steady through the bumpy years. The pension still pays. The Social Security check still arrives. The mortgage is mostly paid off.

The worker in the middle has no good move.

Comparison matrix with rows for career stages and columns for outcomes, with two amber cells in the mid-career and late-career rows marking where the collision lands
Source: Younger workers can adapt. Older workers near retirement can ride it out. The two amber cells in the middle are where the collision lands.

The mid-career worker stands like a tree in a hurricane. The accountant at forty-five. The paralegal at fifty. The mid-level project manager at fifty-two. The credential is real. The mortgage is real. The dependents are real. The savings plan is real and built on a forty-year career assumption that the next seven years break.

The technical forecast does not have a story for this worker. The talk that names abundance and unrest in the same sentence does not name who absorbs which one. The talk treats the transition as bumpy. The bumps land here. The bumps land on the parent at the kitchen table who is calculating whether the salary survives the year.

The collision is not abstract. It has names. The names are the readers of this post.

The middle worker is the worker the forecast cannot see. The forecast can see the kid who has not started yet. The forecast can see the retiree who has finished. The middle worker sits in the gap between the two, and the gap is exactly where the transition lands hardest.

The retirement plan was built on an economy that no longer exists#

The savings formula assumed three things. Wage growth. Asset appreciation. A knowable horizon. The transition breaks all three at once.

Wage growth depends on which side of the AI line the work sits on. A worker whose job AI replaces does not see the paycheck rise. A worker whose job AI augments sees the paycheck rise, often a lot, until the augmentation tilts toward replacement.

The two cohorts look identical from the desk on the first Monday of the year. The difference shows up in the year-end check, when one paycheck held and the other did not. The worker has been clearing mortgage payments out of the bank account on the assumption the salary holds.

Asset appreciation depends on whether abundance arrives as falling prices or as concentrated capital returns. If prices fall, the same dollar buys more bread and medicine for the family. If returns concentrate at the top of the capital stack, the median worker’s portfolio does not catch the lift. The first story is the optimist’s. The second story is the record of forty years.

The horizon is no longer forty years. The next three to seven years are the discontinuous ones. After that the shape of the economy is not the one the savings formula was tuned to.

The advice the forecast offers is to stop saving. That advice was offered to a younger audience.

The worker who is sixty today sits at the table with a spouse and a calculator on a Sunday afternoon. The numbers stretch through the bumpy years before any abundant outcome arrives, or they do not. The savings do not stretch through ten years of disrupted earnings just because the abundance is coming after.

The retirement plan was built for a stable horizon. The horizon is no longer stable.

The household that built the plan around a forty-year career and a thirty-year retirement has a planning problem the talk does not name. The home, the children, the parent in the spare bedroom all live inside that plan. The post does not give the talk’s advice. The post names the gap and stays with it.

Care work is the labor the AI transition does not solve#

The surgical robot is easy to imagine. The humanoid platform stands at the table. The blade moves with millimeter precision. The procedure ends. The patient lives. Every robot has performed every variant of the operation in shared experience, and the gap between the best human surgeon and the best robot closes inside five years.

The night nurse is harder to imagine. The dementia patient does not lie still. The conversation does not follow a script. The nurse sits in the chair beside the bed for hours, holds a hand, repeats the same answer to the same question, takes the patient to the bathroom, changes the sheets, returns to the chair. The work is not precision. The work is presence.

The night nurse holds a hand like a lighthouse on a rocky coast.

Care work is the labor the transition does not solve quickly. It is also the labor that grows fastest as the population ages. The aging child watches a parent fade. The aging spouse watches a partner forget the morning. The household at the center of the care economy is not the household the forecast addresses.

The surgical robot replaces a small slice of healthcare. The night nurse, the home health aide, the hospice worker, the dementia ward staff, the family caregiver, the daughter who flies home every other weekend to sit with a parent: that is the rest of healthcare. AI does not replace the work because the work is not the kind AI replaces.

The aging parent at home, the daughter on the phone, the son driving across the state for the weekly visit: those are the families the talk does not name. The labor of care is the labor that survives longest. It also pays the least and stays the most invisible.

The jobs that survive longest are the ones the forecast does not name. Care work is the category. It anchors what it means to grow older in a household that holds its people through the years.

The forecast is abundance and unrest in the same window. The conventional framings pick one outcome and skip the and. The collision lands at the kitchen table, where a parent calculates whether the savings stretch through the bumpy years. That gap is what the post is about.

Source

The argument draws on a public interview with Peter Diamandis and Dave Blondon on the Moonshots podcast, December 2025.

Questions readers ask

Six questions on this essay.

01 What is universal high income?

Universal high income is the forecast that goods and services become so cheap that the same income buys far more. It is not a check from the government. It is not the same as universal basic income. The mechanism is deflation. As the cost of producing goods collapses toward the cost of materials and electricity, prices fall, and the household income that bought one car last year buys two cars next year and three cars the year after. The slogan is universal high income. The mechanism is falling prices, not transfer payments. The slogan also skips the question of what happens to the household during the years between the start of the transition and the arrival of the cheaper prices.

02 Which workers are most exposed to AI in the next three years?

Mid-career knowledge workers whose work is text, screens, and judgment without a physical anchor. The accountant. The paralegal. The mid-level analyst. The associate at a law firm. The copywriter. The drafter. The scheduler. The middle manager whose work is summarizing meetings, routing requests, and producing reports. These workers hold credentials built when bits were scarce. Bits are no longer scarce. The work that lives in bits is the work AI does cheaply, today, in production. Younger workers entering the field can route around the exposure by choosing different work. Older workers near retirement can ride it out. The middle worker has neither move available and no story from the forecast about what comes next.

03 Why does electricity matter more than chips for AI growth?

Because the chips are easier to make than the power is to deliver. A semiconductor fabrication plant can scale chip output in eighteen months. A grid interconnection takes a year before the substation is even permitted. Cooling water for a gigawatt cluster requires a river. Transformers are on multi-year backorder. The largest training cluster in the world had to stitch together a patchwork of gas turbines to get past the grid wait, because the grid wait was a year and the cluster could not pause for it. The bottleneck on AI rollout is not silicon. The bottleneck is steel, copper, concrete, water, and the permit. Those move slowly. The chip moves quickly.

04 How should an older worker think about retirement savings during the AI transition?

Carefully. The forecast that says do not save for retirement was offered to a younger audience that has thirty working years ahead. The worker who is sixty today has a different problem. The savings have to survive the three to seven bumpy years before any abundant outcome arrives. The advice cannot be the same. The household that built a plan around a forty-year career and a thirty-year retirement faces a planning problem the talk does not name. The wage may not arrive. The asset may not appreciate. The horizon is no longer stable. The household needs a plan that does not depend on the abundance arriving on time. The household also needs a plan that does not depend on the income arriving without interruption.

05 What is the difference between universal high income and universal basic income?

Universal basic income is a transfer payment from the government to the citizen. The amount is fixed or indexed. The source is the tax base. Universal high income is not a payment at all. It is the forecast that the cost of goods falls so far that the income the citizen already has buys far more. The mechanism is deflation in the production economy. The political mechanism is also different. Universal basic income requires a political coalition for redistribution. Universal high income requires nothing more than the production economy continuing to expand faster than the money supply. The first is a policy. The second is a forecast about what happens if nothing is done. Both are possible. Neither is automatic.

06 Which jobs grow fastest as AI replaces white-collar work?

Care work, broadly defined. The home health aide who visits the apartment three times a week. The hospice worker. The dementia ward staff. The family caregiver who is also a working professional. The night nurse on the floor at three in the morning. The kindergarten teacher who reads to a child too young to read alone. These jobs cannot be performed by AI because the work is presence, judgment in real time, and trust built across many small interactions. The population is also aging fast, and the demand for this work grows with it. The pay is low. The status is low. The work is what the economy will need most as the share of the population over seventy crosses thresholds the country has not seen before.

About the author
Hanh D. Brown, writer.

Essayist writing on craft, voice, aging, and what gets harder to say with the years. Twenty years building AI systems for life-stage decisions. Now writing the publication that has the time to ask why.

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